This essay describes the background and possible reasons for legal intervention in the use of lime in the early bleaching industry and draws on the Statutes at Large and other Acts of Parliament as primary sources. The developing chemical knowledge that may have contributed to the later Acts of repeal is also considered in some detail. The earliest noted prohibition was in 1633 and the years 1823, 1825, and 1828 were important repeal dates. No related legislation later than 1828 has (...) been found. During the period from 1633 to 1828 there were many renewals and modifications to existing laws concerning linen and hempen manufacture; several of these contained subsections regarding bleaching. The considerable number of such Acts may account for the apparent confusion shown by earlier authors on this subject. Furthermore, the various Acts passed by the Irish House of Commons over its lifetime from 1400 to 1800, with its many interruptions, were published in a limited number of editions and are consequently held by few libraries. Ireland instituted its own laws and it was only after the Act of Union in 1800 that matters were dealt with by Westminster. Indeed, earlier historians have not always appreciated that, at certain periods of the history of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Scotland had their own separate parliaments. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RECONSIDERING AQUINAS AS POSTLIBERAL THEOLOGIAN FREDERICK J. CROSSON University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana IN A RECENT issue of this journal 1 Bruce Marshall argued that the position of Thomas Aquinas on faith and reasonin particular on the meaning of assertions about God-can be read as fundamentally convergent with that of the contemporary theologian, George Lindbeck. The claim is striking because, as Marshall acknowledges, the traditional reading (...) of Aquinas is quite different. Traditionally-Gilson is Marshall's example -it has been thought that the conclusion of a demonstration of God's existence or unity could be true, could correspond to reality, quite independently of the religious doctrines concerning the revealed mysteries of the Godhead. But Marshall argues that, in fact, the texts of Aquinas explicitly deny that the non-believer is really succeeding in talking about God at all. The claim is a challenging one, and one from which there seems much to learn, because it is not only bold-and so promises a significant shift in the traditional understanding of Aquinas's meaning-but confronts many of the texts which seem to warrant that traditional understanding. Even if his reading is wrong, which I believe it is, there is benefit in thinking through the reasons why it is wrong and in clarifying not only what Aquinas taught but also what is at issue. I propose to do three things: first, to state the interpretation which Marshall, enlarging on Lindbeck, wants to give of the 1 Bruce D. Marshall, "Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian," The Thomist 53 (July 89) : 353-402. The article is followed by George Lindbeck, "Response to Bruce Marshall," 403-406. 481 482 FREDERICK J. CROSSON position of Aquinas on the possibility of natural knowledge of God; second, to examine several instances of Marshall's reading which are integral to his arguments but which I think are wrong, i.e., misconstrue the texts he is dealing with; third, to reflect briefly on one of the larger issues which seem to me involved in the questions here discussed, namely the commensurability of the teachings of the major religious traditions. I In Lindbeck's view,2 the propositions about God (or "the Ultimate Mystery") which religious doctrines assert can have " ontological truth " or correspond to reality only if the categories in terms of which those propositions are formulated are adequate to express that reality. This condition may be called the " categorial truth " of the doctrine, and " can thus be described as potential ontological truth,... a religion has this kind of truth when its ' categories ' are capable of being used to describe what is ultimately real" (359).3 The categorial truth of religious doctrine is thus a necessary condition for its teachings to be "ontologically true," i.e., to correspond to what is. But it is not a sufficient condition. The categories employed by the teachings must be used in the proper way: the composing and dividing of the categories (e.g., "Father," "person," "nature") must be a composing and dividing which asserts what, according to the religious doctrine, really is combined and separated. But for the utterances 4 of a believer to be ontologically true, they 2 George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984). 3 Page numbers without other citation will be to Marshall's article; see note 1. 4 Lindbeck also seems to make it a necessary condition of " ontological truth" that the utterance be performative in J. L. Austin's sense. The Nature of Doctrine, p. 68 et pass. Since Marshall does not dwell on this in his article, I only note it here. For a brief but incisive criticism of this condition, see Paul Griffiths, "An Apology for Apologetics," Faith and Philosophy 5 (Oct. 1988) : 409-11. It may be that Lindbeck was led to stress utterances as the locus of truth, curious though that seems, because the alternative is to make what is uttered true, and that would be independent of the person's practice in a way that utterance seems not to be. AQUINAS AS POSTLIBERAL THEOLOGIAN 483 must also be consistent or cohere with the paradigmatic propositions of the religion, with its revealed... (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:REJOINDER TO BRUCE MARSHALL FREDERICK J. CROSSON University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, J.ndiana DISCUSSIONS HAVE to end sometime, and the differences in the reading of Aquinas by Bruce Marshall and myself will perhaps have sufficiently come into view if brief comments on several points are made. 1. In his second statement 1 Marshall seems to have shifted his argument. Originally he argued that a non-believer (e.g. a (...) pagan philosopher such as Aristotle) could not know or even properly refer to God.2 But in the subsequent statement, he seems to concede that, according to Aquinas, " That there is one God was known even by the philosophers, and is not a part of faith " and that " while some of the Gentiles knew God with respect to certain things which were knowable by reason, nevertheless they did not know him insofar as he is the Father...." (501; cf. 51213 ). Marshall seems now to hold that although that knowledge was possible at one time, it is not any longer: As Thomas reads Paul, then, the error (and specifically the idolatry) of the Gentiles overrides the knowledge of himself which God has given to them " from 1creation through the senses " ; in consequence the further possibility of this knowledge... is withdrawn by God. With regard to the Gentiles, including their sapientes-the philosophers with demonstrative arguments-the denial of knowledge overrides the initial ascription of it (512, my emphasis). 1 Bruce D. Marshall, " Thomas, Thomisms, and Truth", The Thomist 56 (1992) pp. 499-524. His original article was in ibid. 53 (1989), pp. 353-402. Page references in the text or footnotes without other citation will be to these articles. 2 " The person whose discourse does not cohere with the broader norms of Christian belief is not even talking about God, and so cannot possibly know or refer to him " (378-379), emphasis mine. 299 300 FREDERICK J. CROSSON I confess to a certain difficulty in understanding what "overrides " means here: cancels? contradicts? blots out? In any case, it seems that it was, at some time and for some non-Christian thinkers (e.g. Aristotle), possible to come to the knowledge of God's existence by reason, but that Marshall interprets Aquinas as saying that that knowledge is no longer even possible. 2. Marshall's general claim is that Aquinas must be read as holding a coherentist notion of revealed truth, so that a pagan and a Christian cannot mean the same thing the word ' God '. But Aquinas says exactly the opposite: Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the nature of God as he is in himself, but each knows him by some understanding (aliquam rationein ) of causality or excellence or remotion... Consequently a pagan can take this name God, when he says an idol is God, in the same way that a Catholic does in saying an idol is not God.3 3. Again and again, Marshall returns to the claim that, according to Aquinas, " In simple things any failure of knowledge (defectus cognitionis) is in fact a total lack of knowledge " (382) ;4 he cites the Commentary on John, in which Thomas declares... while it is possible for composite things to be known in part and to be unknown in part, if simple things are not grasped completely, they are not known (501). In Marshall's view, these claims about the knowledge of simple forms exclude the possibility of any adequation between the conclusion of a pagan philosopher's demonstration and the Divine esse: "... the defectus cognitionis of which Thomas speaks in II-II, 2, 2, ad 3, entails not a partial, but a total lack of corres:. pondence between the mind and God" (384). Marshall seems to read such statements as if they made the following objection: a Summa Theologiae I, q. 3, a. 10, ad 5: Dicendum quod ipsam naturam Dei prout in se est, neque catholicus neque paganus cognoscit; sed uterque cognoscit earn secumdum aliquam rationem causalitatis vel excellentiae vel remotionis... Et secundum hoc in eadem significatione accipere potest gentilis hoc nomen Deus, cum. (shrink)

It may seem odd to review a New York social club's yearbook, with its list of members’ addresses and series of committee reports. But such books sometimes contain material of more general interest. The latest one from the Century Association, for example, devotes 250 of its 685 pages to “Century Memorials”—that is, biographical sketches of recently deceased members, written by other members. Among the well-known figures taken up in these eighty-three sketches are the artists Richard Anuszkiewicz and Robert Motherwell; the (...) architects Henry N. Cobb and Charles A. Platt; the newspaper editors Harold Evans and Whitelaw Reid; the historians Henry F. Graff and William McFeely; the translator and literary scholar Donald Keene; the collector of literary and musical manuscripts Frederick Koch; the popular writer on Russian history Robert K. Massie; the clergyman James Parks Morton; the financier Felix G. Rohatyn; the lawyers Whitney North Seymour Jr. and Isaac N. Phelps Stokes; the literary editor Elisabeth Sifton; the university president Michael Sovern; the museum director Evan H. Turner; and the broadcast journalist Sander Vanocur. The sketches are generally well written and often richly evocative: the writers include Louis Begley, Kenneth T. Jackson, D. T. Max, and Honor Moore.The long shelf of Century volumes like this one clearly constitutes a valuable contribution to prosopographical literature. And the Century is not the only institution with such a tradition (other examples are the British Academy and the American Philosophical Society); but their publications are a frequently overlooked source, one not always available in research libraries. Unfortunately, it is also a source that seems to be diminishing: the American Antiquarian Society and the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation are examples of organizations, each with a history of providing biographical information, that are no longer doing so. Of course, the great previous runs of the former's Proceedings and the latter's Reports remain (one hopes) on the shelves for those who know to look for them. A step in the opposite direction has recently been taken by the Grolier Club, which has not had such a tradition (except for two biographical volumes in 1959 and 2000): its Gazette now includes a section of memorials in each issue. This is a welcome move, but one has to regret that so little scholarly use is made of this whole body of biographical detail and reminiscence. (shrink)

Edmund Burke and India is the first thorough treatment of Burke's views on India, even though the affairs of the British Indian empire occupied more of Burke's attention - and occupy more space among his writings and speeches - than any of the other causes to which he devoted himself during his long public career. Relating Burke's views on India to ideas expressed in his other writings, Whelan offers a comprehensive assessment of Burke's political theory as a whole. Burke appears (...) here as one of the few classic political thinkers in the Western canon to have made a serious and sustained effort to understand a non-European society and culture. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXI, Number 2, November 1995, pp. 315-332 Robertson, Hume, and the Balance of Power FREDERICK G. WHELAN William Robertson, like his Scottish Enlightenment colleague David Hume, practiced a kind of philosophic history which, although it appears to consist mainly of narratives of political and military events, is also designed to teach moral and political lessons of general significance and utility. The principal theme of Hume's (...) History of England, for example, is the growth of legal and constitutional government in connection with the emergence of modern society; Hume's narrative implicitly justifies both such a government and the moderate politics on which it depends. A theme of comparable importance in Robertson's History of Charles V (1769) is the emergence of a balance of power and thence a relatively stable international system among European states in the early sixteenth century, when the policy of balance first clearly appeared. As he declares in his Preface: The political principles and maxims then established still continue to operate. The ideas concerning the balance of power, then introduced or rendered general, still influence the councils of nations. (R 307)1 Robertson both describes the relevant policy decisions (especially the alliance between the traditional enemies, England and France, to counter the threat posed by Charles Vs unprecedentedly large empire) and justifies such policies as reasonable and beneficial.2 Frederick G. Whelan is at the Political Science Department, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh PA 15260 USA. 316 Frederick G. Whelan In treating this theme, Robertson was taking up a topic that was of interest to Hume as well. Hume refers on a number of occasions to the sixteenth century balance of power in his History chapters on the reign of Henry VIII (1759),3 especially in the portion extending through the 1520s, and he treats the topic more systematically in his earlier essay "Of the Balance of Power" (1752).4 Hume like Robertson defends balance of power policies in general, and Hume certainly (Robertson probably) had a more particular reason for doing so: to justify contemporary British (Whig) foreign policy (and several wars), which since the reign of Louis XIV had aimed at maintaining a European counterbalance to France.5 Hume's and Robertson's favorable descriptions of the sixteenth century anti-Habsburg policy provide a useful background for defending the eighteenth century anti-Bourbon policy.6 Indeed, both Hume and Robertson probably exaggerated the prevalence of the balance of power, at least as a conscious policy, in the early sixteenth century; although they were no doubt correct in noting that something like the modern state system first began to take shape at that time, they seem to have projected the eighteenth century emphasis on balance backwards in time as a way of legitimizing it.7 Robertson sums up the fifty year period he covers by observing that the similar stage of development of the states of Europe at that time, together with the policy of balance, permitted the preservation of a fairly stable system of independent states that has lasted until the present: But the advantages possessed by one state were counterbalanced by circumstances favourable to others; and thus prevented any from attaining such superiority as might have been fatal to all. The nations of Europe in that age, as in the present, were like one great family.... There was not among them that wide diversity of character and of genius which, in almost every period of history, hath exalted the Europeans above the inhabitants of the other quarters of the globe, and seems to have destined the one to rule and the others to obey. (R 704) Hume's concern with contemporary policy, and with France, is more conspicuous: Europe has now, for above a century, remained on the defensive against the greatest force that ever, perhaps, was formed by the civil or political combination of mankind. And such is the influence of the maxim here treated of, that tho' that ambitious nation, in the five last general wars, have been victorious in four, and unsuccessful only in one, they have not much enlarged their dominions, nor acquired a total ascendant over EUROPE.... In the last three of these general Hume... (shrink)

The Executive Council of the HSA has engaged Darrel E. Christensen to serve as Chairman of a Committee for Arrangements for the symposium on "Hegel and the Sciences" being planned for December 4-6, 1970. Professor George L. Kline is serving as a member of this Committee. A third member will be announced shortly, when the site of the meeting has been determined. Persons interested in contributing to the program are invited to submit papers, proposals for papers, or indications of the (...) type of paper to which they might wish to direct a prepared commentary. The theme is construed to embrace the following four areas of investigation: Hegel's philosophies of nature and the sciences within the context of his philosophy as a hole and the thought of his time, implications of Hegel's philosophies of nature and the sciences for understanding other aspects of his philosophy, the relation of Hegel's thought and method of relating to the sciences to developments and issues in the sciences and the philosophy of science since his time, and the contributions of philosophers who in some identifiable way have practiced Hegel's method or style of doing philosophy as these relate to the sciences or to the philosophy of science since his time. The scope of the theme may be modified, et the discretion of the Committee on Arrangements, to accommodate a promising paper. The deadline for completed papers to be submitted is September 1, after which they will be mimeographed and copies sent to commentators and, a little later, to persons who register to attend the meeting. The plan is to have mimeographed copies of commentaries in the hands of authors of principal papers by early November. Papers are to be 5,000 to 12,500 words in length, but the oral presentation should not exceed 30 minutes. Commentaries and replies may run 2,000 words each, but the oral presentation should not take longer than about 12 minutes. The Hegel Society of America will retain copyright on the material presented to the Symposium, which copyright will automatically revert to the respective authors of material not placed for publication by the Committee on Arrangements of the Society by February 1, 1972. Correspondence regarding the program should be addressed to: Darrel E. Christensen, Department of Philosophy, Wofford College, Spartanburg, South Carolina 29301. (shrink)

Hume's theory of government and allegiance falls into two parts. In its better known segment Hume explains the conjectural origin of government in general as a convention necessary to enforce the rules of justice and provide other public goods, and he grounds the general duty of allegiance on the utility of government in making stable social life possible. To his credit, however, Hume goes on to give separate treatment to the topic of what he terms the ‘objects of allegiance”, or (...) rules for assessing the legitimacy of particular political regimes or rulers. Given the general desirability of government and of obedience to it, we might nevertheless ask what entitles the particular government in existence to rule over us; more pressingly, there might be competing claimants to this position. What standards should guide our decision about where our allegiance is due when there is more than one alternative? (shrink)

Part ii, "the future of hegel scholarship," by howard p. kainz. although the usual function of a bibliographical survey is to attend to what work has already been done, it would not seem inappropriate now and then for such a survey to call attention to work which still needs to be done in a certain area, i.e., to point out the existence of "gaps." the author, in attending to this admittedly subjective task, notes that in the area of hegel research (...) a) the translation of some selected works by and about hegel will contribute especially important instruments for the understanding of hegel, and should have some priority; b) efforts at the formalization of hegel's dialectical logic should be furthered; c) further inquisition into the hegelian roots of marxian and kierkegaardian positions is warranted; and d) the presentation of paradoxical hegelian content in the explicit form of paradox would be a useful complement to other prevalent modes of exposition. (shrink)

"The Fragility of Consciousness is the first published collection of his essays and contains several of his best known writings as well as unpublished work. The essays in this volume exhibit a long interdisciplinary engagement with the relationship between faith and reason in the context of the crisis of culture that has marked twentieth- and twenty-first century thought and practice. Frederick G. Lawrence, with his profound and generous commitment to the intellectual life of the church, has produced a body (...) of work that engages with Heidegger, Gadamer, Habermas, Ricoeur, Strauss, Voegelin, and Benedict XVI among others. These essays also explore various themes such as the role of religion in a secular age, political theology, economics, neo-Thomism, Christology, and much more. In an age marked by social, cultural, political, and ecclesial fragmentation, Lawrence models a more generous way--one that prioritizes friendship, conversation, and understanding above all else."--. (shrink)

Students of Hegel will soon have at their disposal a complete translation of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, "the only complete, matured, and authentic statement of Hegel's philosophical system", and the last of the four major works published by Hegel in his lifetime to be fully translated into English. Early next year, the Clarendon Press at Oxford will issue a translation of the second part of the Encyclopaedia, The Philosophy of Nature, by A.V. Miller, recent translator of Hegel's Science (...) of Logic. The translation includes the valuable Zusätze, and was supervised throughout by Professor J.N. Findlay of Yale, who has also written an Introduction for it. With it will also be published a new edition of the Philosophy of Mind, the third part of the Encyclopaedia. The text of the paragraphs is the familiar Wallace translation, but added to this volume are the Zusätze newly translated by Mr. Millet, and a new Introduction by Professor Findlay. When the present edition of the first part of the Encyclopaedia, usually referred to as "the Lesser Logic" has been exhausted, if will also be republished with some revisions and additions. Professor Findlay adds that all the proofs were done last June, and that if will appear "at a price that students will not find prohibitive". (shrink)

How did the events of the early modern period affect the way gender and the self were represented? This collection of essays attempts to respond to this question by analysing a wide spectrum of cultural concerns - humanism, technology, science, law, anatomy, literacy, domesticity, colonialism, erotic practices, and the theatre - in order to delineate the history of subjectivity and its relationship with the postmodern fragmented subject. The scope of this analysis expands the terrain explored by feminist theory, while its (...) feminist focus reveals that the subject is always gendered - although the terms in which gender is conceived and represented change across history. Feminist Readings of Early Modern Culture not only explores the representation of gendered subjects, but in its commitment to balancing the productive tensions of methodological diversity, also speaks to contemporary challenges facing feminism. (shrink)

The essays in this book deal broadly with the question of what form reasoning about life and society can take in a culture permeated by scientific and technical modes of thought. They attempt to identify certain very basic types of questions that seem to escape scientific resolution and call for, in Gadamer's view, philosophical reflection of a hermeneutic sort.In effect, Gadamer argues for the continued practical relevance of Socratic-Platonic modes of thought in respect to contemporary issues. As part of this (...) argument, he advances his own views on the interplay of science, technology, and social policy.These essays, which are not available in any existing translation or collection of Gadamer's work, are remarkably up-to-date with respect to the present state of his thinking, and they address issues that are particularly critical to social theory and philosophy.Perhaps more than anyone else, Hans-Georg Gadamer, who is Professor Emeritus at the University of Heidelberg and Distinguished Visiting Professor at Boston College, is the doyen of German Philosophy. His previously translated works have been widely and enthusiastically received in this country. He is recognized as the chief theorist of hermeneutics, a strong and growing movement here in a number of disciplines, from theology and literary criticism to philosophy and social theory.A book in the series Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought. (shrink)

Dès ses premiers écrits, Lonergan a été attentif à la dimension d'amitié qui caractérise les ordres trinitaire et créé. L'homme est par essence ouvert au delà de lui-même; ne pouvant pas coïncider à soi, il est appelé à quelque conversion. La pensée moderne, qui par contre l'a prétendu capable de présence à soi; soutint l'individualisme òu le rapport à l'autre devenait instrumental. La réaction post-moderne, qui accentue l'idée d"autre', réveille la conscience à ses traits plus humains, en favorisant en même (...) temps un retour à la tradition philosophique et théologique sur l'amitié, òu d'ailleurs son idée d''autre' se voit elle-même enrichie. La réflexion thomiste sur la charité comme amitié divine est ici décisive. Lonergan la reprend en explicitant l'essence du corps mystique. L'attention à l'expérience concrète invite enfin à conduire la réflexion jusqu'au plan de l'éducation, d'òu on ne peut pas abstraire l'exigence du don de soi, à l'exemple du Christ qu'y s'est abaissé jusqu'à nous. (shrink)

While at first such a comparison may be startling, Whelan argues convincingly that Hume's writing, commonly regarded as moderate and amiable, is indeed a locus of realist liberal political theory.

Intended for scholars in the fields of political theory, and the history of political thought, this two-volume examines David Hume's Political Thought and that of his contemporaries, including Smith, Blackstone, Burke and Robertson. This book is unified by its temporal focus on the middle and later decades of the eighteenth century and hence on what is usually taken to be the core period of the Enlightenment, a somewhat problematic term. Covering topics such as property, contract and resistance theory, religious establishments, (...) the law of nations, the balance of power, demography, and the role of unintended consequences in social life, Frederick G. Whelan convincingly conveys the diversity--and creativity--of the intellectual engagements of even a limited set of Enlightenment thinkers in contrast to dismissive attitudes, in some quarters, toward the Enlightenment and its supposed unitary project. Political Thought of Hume and his Contemporaries: Enlightenment Projects Vol. 1 contains six in-depth studies of issues in eighteenth-century political thought, with an emphasis on topics in normative theory such as property rights, the social contract, resistance to oppressive government, and religious liberty. The central figure is David Hume, with substantial attention to Edmund Burke, Adam Smith, and others in the period. The introduction situates the studies in the Enlightenment and considers interpretations of that movement. Political Thought of Hume and his Contemporaries: Enlightenment Projects Vol. 2 contains six in-depth studies of eighteenth-century political thought, including both normative issues and examples of Enlightenment social science, including international relations and law, the problem of double standards, political economy, demography, and the causes of imperial decline. The central figure is David Hume, with substantial attention to William Robertson, Adam Smith, Montesquieu, Malthus, and others. (shrink)

A central aspect of people's beliefs about the mind is that mental activities—for example, thinking, reasoning, and problem solving—are interrelated, with some activities being kinds or parts of others. In common-sense psychology, reasoning is a kind of thinking and reasoning is part of problem solving. People's conceptions of these mental kinds and parts can furnish clues to the ordinary meaning of these terms and to the differences between folk and scientific psychology. In this article, we use a new technique for (...) deriving partial orders to analyze subjects' decisions about whether one mental activity is a kind or part of another. The resulting taxonomies and partonomies differ from those of common object categories in exhibiting a converse relation in this domain: One mental activity is a part of another if the second is a kind of the first. The derived taxonomies and partonomies also allow us to predict results from further experiments that examine subjects' memory for these activities, their ratings of the activities' importance, and their judgments about whether there could be "possible minds" that possess some of the activities but not others. (shrink)

The Executive Council pro tem of the HSA, organized during a business session of the Wofford Symposium at Spartanburg, S. C. last November, met et Vanderbilt University the following March and drafted a constitution for the Society. The members of this Council were Darrel E. Christensen of Wofford College, Robert L. Perkins of the University of South Alabama, Frederick G. Weiss, George L. Kline, Warren E. Steinkraus, Donald P. Verene, and Otho M. Adkins. Shortly thereafter the constitution was adopted (...) and an election was held. Professors Christensen, Steinkraus, Perkins, and Verene were elected President, Vice-President, Secretary, and Treasurer of the Society. * * * PURPOSE * * * The purpose of the HSA, as specified by Article II of the constitution, is "to promote the study of the philosophy of Hegel, its place within the history of thought, its relation to social, political, and cultural movements since his time, and its relevance to contemporary issues and fields of knowledge. In addition to the study of the thought and significance of Hegel, the Society has as its purpose the furtherance of original philosophical thought which has its basis in the philosophy of Hegel or which treats issues in the style, manner, or method of Hegel.". (shrink)

The HSA constitution stipulates that "any person maybe admitted to membership by the Council, subject to confirmation by the Society et the next meeting and shall continue a member so long as he pays dues as determined in the by-laws." Annual dues for students are three dollars, for all others, five dollars. Application for membership should include name, position, institution and address, and should be submitted, with payment of dues, to Professor Donald P. Verene, Treasurer, HSA, Department of Philosophy, Northern (...) Illinois University, Dekalb, Illinois 60115. (shrink)

Presents an illuminating interpretation of key 18th- and 19th-century European political thinkers' accounts and assessments of the societies and political institutes of the non-Western world. This book is of interest to students and scholars of both political philosophy and thought as well as historians of this important period of history.

The 14th International Congress of Philosophy, held late last summer in Vienna, had an entire subsection devoted to Hegel. Several papers were presented by philosophers from America, including: "Hegel In Light of His First American Followers", by Professor Loyd D. Easton of Ohio Wesleyan University; "Hegel and Husserl", by Professor W.H. Werkmeister of The Florida State University; "Hegel's Theory of Signification & The Origin of Dialectic", by Professor Daniel Cook of Herbert H. Lehman College ; "Beginning the System: Kierkegaard and (...) Hegel", by Professor Robert Perkins, University of South Alabama. These papers and others will be published in the Congress Proceedings. Inquiries should be directed to the University of Vienna Department of Philosophy. * * * Professor H.S. Harris of Glendon College, York University, Toronto, will shortly have published in a volume titled Essays in Honour of Max Fisch "The Fragment on Faith and Being in Hegel's Early Theological Writings". The essay contains the text translation and a full commentary on the fragment Glauben und Sein in Nohl. * * * The Fall issue of Philosophy Today contain an article by Professor Howard P. Kainz of Marquette University titled "Hegel's Characterization of Truth in the Phenomenology". * * * James F. Donaldson of Texas Technological College has an article titled "The Origin of Hegel's Dialectic" in the current issue of Lavel Theologique et Philosophique. A brief abstract of the paper may be found in the Fall, 1969 Philosopher's Index. (shrink)

An analysis of student learning with the LISP tutor indicates that while LISP is complex, learning it is simple. The key to factoring out the complexity of LISP is to monitor the learning of the 500 productions in the LISP tutor which describe the programming skill. The learning of these productions follows the power‐law learning curve typical of skill acquisition. There is transfer from other programming experience to the extent that this programming experience involves the same productions. Subjects appear to (...) differ only on the general dimensions of how well they acquire the productions and how well they retain the productions. Instructional manipulations such as remediation, content of feedback, and timing of feedback are effective to the extent they give students more practice programming, and explain to students why correct solutions work. (shrink)

If people believe that one activity is a kind of another, they also tend to believe that the second activity is a part of the first. For example, they assert that deciding is a kind of thinking and that thinking is a part of deciding. C. Fellbaum and G. A. Miller's (see record 1991-03356-001) explanation for this phenomenon is based on the idea that people interpret part of in the domain of verbs as a type of logical entailment. Their explanation, (...) however, suffers from at least 2 deficiencies. First, it fails to account for parallel effects with nouns (e.g., a contest is a kind of an activity, and an activity is a part of a contest). Second, it contains a flaw that incorrectly predicts many activities to be parts of each other (e.g., coming is part of going and going part of coming). However, a hypothesis L. J. Rips and F. G. Conrad (see record 1989-24843-001) originally proposed for the kind–part reciprocal effect avoids both of these difficulties. (shrink)